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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
nka CAROLYN BOIES,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 880297-CA

CASS BETTINGER,
Defendant/Respondent.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under
§78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, as an appeal from a final order
entered in a civil proceeding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the

trial

court

commit

reversible

error

by

interpreting paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to require that
Defendant's

equity

in

the

parties 1

marital

residence

be

determined on the date of Plaintiff/AppellantTs remarriage?
2.

Did

the

trial

court

commit

reversible

error

by

construing the term "improvements" in paragraph 7 of the Divorce
Decree, as only capital investments?

1

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on August 14,
1980.

The decree awarded the marital domicile of the parties to

Plaintiff, subject to a lien in favor of Defendant.
Shortly after the sale of the marital domicile on August 13,
1987, a dispute arose as to the amount of the sale proceeds to
which each party was entitled.
were

unable

to

resolve

When it appeared that the parties

the dispute by negotiation,

Defendant

filed a motion with the lower court to resolve the dispute.
An evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable David
S. Young, Third District Court Judge, on February 9, 1988.

On

February 18, 1988, Judge Young issued a Memorandum Decision with
respect

to the issues raised

by the parties.

Decision was later incorporated
1988

(hereinafter

The

Memorandum

into an Order dated March 11,

"subject order").

The subject order is the

basis of Plaintiff1s appeal and Defendant's cross appeal.
On March
Rule

18, 1988, Defendant

filed a motion, pursuant to

59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend

order or grant a new trial.

the

subject

However, before the lower court made

a decision on the Rule 59 motion, Plaintiff

filed a premature

Notice of Appeal with this court on May 5, 1988 (Court of Appeals
No.

88-0297 C A ) .

The lower court denied

motion by order dated September 13, 1988.

Defendant's

Defendant thereafter

filed this cross appeal on September 26, 1988.

2

Rule 59

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Appeal in
Case

No. 88-0297-CA.

On March

23, 1989, Plaintiff?s

counsel

filed a motion for an enlargement of time.
Subsequently,

the

Court

of

Appeals

granted

Plaintiff's

Motion for an Enlargement of Time and denied Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss and Plaintiff filed her Appellant's brief on April 19,
1989.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Decree of Divorce in this action entered on August 14,
1980,

clearly

ownership

of

Defendant.

provided
the

that

family

home

Plaintiff
subject

was
to

to be awarded
a lien

the

in favor of

The relevant paragraph of the Decree is quoted on

page 7, infra.

The Decree further provided

that the lien in

favor of Defendant was "forecloseable" when the youngest child
reached

18,

or

when

the

home

was

sold

or

when

Plaintiff

remarried.
Plaintiff remarried on August 14, 1984 (Tr. 34).

This was

the first occurrence of an event making the lien to Defendant due
and payable.
Subsequent to Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff demonstrated
her clear understanding that she was the sole owner of the home
and

that

Defendant

was

merely

a lienholder

(Tr.

54).

She

continued to live in the home for a period of approximately one
year with her new husband (Tr. 7 ) ; at the time she first listed
the

home

agreement

for

sale,

(Tr.

she was

8-9); she

the only

never

3

signer

provided

on

the

Defendant

listing
with

any

opportunity for input on the l i s t i n g p r i c e of the home (Tr. 12);
she

instructed

the

listing

realtor

that

Defendant

was

not

e n t i t l e d t o any information concerning the l i s t i n g or o f f e r s

for

s a l e (Tr. 9, 23); and she made s i g n i f i c a n t c a p i t a l improvements o
the home without p r i o r n o t i c e or c o n s u l t a t i o n with Defendant (Tr.
71) .
At the time of P l a i n t i f f ' s

remarriage, the market value of

the home was SQS^OO.OO1 (Memorandum Decision, para. 2) and the
unpaid balance of the mortgage $20,304.00 2

(Memorandum Decision,

para. 3 ) .
Shortly a f t e r P l a i n t i f f ' s

remarriage, the p a r t i e s attempted

to n e g o t i a t e a means t o pay Defendant's equity (Tr. 34-35; 1415).

However,

the

negotiations

were u n s u c c e s s f u l .

Thus,

P l a i n t i f f decided t o s e l l the home (Tr. 35).
The home was f i r s t

l i s t e d for s a l e in 1984 (Tr. 35).

l i s t i n g was renewed several times and continued u n t i l an

The
offer

was received t o purchase the home in March, 1987, for $91,500.00
(Tr.

46; Ex. 1 ) .

place

on August

Plaintiff
13,

1987

accepted the offer
(Ex.

1).

The c o s t s

and s a l e

took

of

were

sale

$6,113.00 (Memo. Decision, para. 4; Ex. 1 ) .

x

The value stated in the text represents the Court's findings. Plaintiff's expert testified
the value of the home in August, 1984 was $89,000.00 (Tr. 65; Ex. 7). Defendant's expert stated
a value of $100,000.00 (Tr. 21; Ex. 4).
2

The Court's finding as to the amount of the unpaid mortgage balance was taken from Exhibit

2.
4

It was apparent that the market value of the home decreased
between August 30, 1984 (the date that Plaintiff remarried) and
August 13, 1987 (the date the home was sold) (Tr. 22, 69).
In October, 1984, one month after Plaintiff's remarriage,
and

during

Plaintiff

her

occupancy

expended

of

$164.79

Decision, para. 5 ) .

the home with
for

screens

on

her
the

new

husband,

home

(Memo.

In the summer of 1986, approximately

two

years after Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff expended $7,800.00
for

roof

repairs

and

reconstruction

(Memo. Decision, para. 5; Tr. 38-43).
made by

Plaintiff without

of the roof of the home
These improvements were

any prior notice or acquiesence of

Defendant (Tr. 71).
The decline in the real estate market between August, 1984
(date of remarriage) and August, 1987 (date of sale) more than
offset the increase in the value of the home by reason of the
improvements made by Plaintiff (Tr. 22, 69).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Court construed the Decree of Divorce in accordance

with the established rules of construction and its interpretation
of paragraph 7, with regard to the date of Defendant's equity
determination, should be upheld.
II.
for

the

The Court erred in holding that Defendant was liable
costs

of

any

improvements

remarriage.

5

made

after

Plaintiff's

ARGUMENT
INCORPORATION OF BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANT
Many of the arguments made by Plaintiff
assessed

in Defendants

Defendant

hereby

are examined

and

brief in support of his cross appeal.

incorporates

by

reference

all

points

and

authorities stated therein.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The law in Utah, regarding the standard of appellate review
of a divorce action is quite clear.

The appellate court will not

disturb the findings of the trial court unless clear abuse of
discretion is shown.
1987);

Boyle vs. Boyle, 735 P. 2d 669 (Utah App.

Smith vs. Smith, 738 P. 2d

655

(Utah App.

1987).

The

applicable standard of review is as follows:
"While the Supreme Court may review
questions of both law and fact in
equity cases, it is not bound to
substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court, and because of
trial court's advantage position,
Supreme Court gives considerable
deference to its findings and
judgment". See Hunter vs. Hunter,
669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983).
The party appealing the order entered by the trial court
must
trial

show that the evidence clearly preponderates
court's

discretion.

findings

or

that

the

court

has

against

the

abused

its

Thompson vs. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985).

In

the instant action, Plaintiff has failed to meet either of the
aforementioned standards.

6

POINT I
THE TERMS OF THE SUBJECT ORDER WITH REGARD TO THE DATE
AT WHICH DEFENDANT'S EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOME WAS
DETERMINED AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE
DECREE WAS PROPERLY ENTERED BY THE LOWER COURT
A,

INTERPRETATION
Plaintiff

contends

that

the

lower

court

erred

in

its

interpretation of paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree.
Defendant acknowledges the legal principle that the language
of judgments is subject to construction according to rules that
apply

to

all

written

instruments.

Moon

Lake

Association vs. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1975).

Water

Users

The rule of

construction and interpretation of instruments is set forth in
Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981).

In Utah

Valley, the Utah Supreme Court held:
"The b a s i c r u l e of c o n t r a c t
interpretation is that the intent
of the parties is to be ascertained
from the content of the instrument
itself, the rationale for the rule
being to preserve the sanctity of
written instruments". Utah Valley,
supra at 1061.
The paragraph of the Divorce Decree that is in contention
states as follows:
"7.
Plaintiff is awarded the real
property of the marriage in the
form of a home located at 2740 East
4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
subject to a lien thereon for onehalf of the equity that may be in
the
house
at t h e
time
of
liquidation (which contemplates an
increasing equity as the value
7

increases).
The equity is defined
as the fair market value or sales
price at the time Defendant becomes
entitled to liquidate his lien as
set forth herein, less the amount
of mortgages, costs of improvements
made by Plaintiff and costs of
sale.
This lien shall not be
forecloseable until the youngest
child reaches 18, or until the home
is s o l d or u n t i l
Plaintiff
remarries".
The first sentence of paragraph 7 establishes Defendantf s
interest

in

the marital

domicile,

i.e.,

"subject

to

a

lien

thereon for one-half of the equity that may be in the house at
the time of liquidation (which contemplates an increasing equity
as the value increases.
The second sentence merely defines the term equity.
The third sentence delineates the triggering mechanism which
is required to happen before Defendant may foreclose on his lien.
Foreclosure is defined as:
an equity of redemption.

A termination of all rights of the

mortgagor

or

mortgage".

Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition.

Defendant

his

"to shut out, to bar, to destroy

did

grantee

not have

in

the

property

this right

to

covered

terminate

rights in the property until one of the aforementioned
occurred.

by

the

all

his

events

However, upon the occurrence, the right vested

in

Defendant.
It is obvious that the parties
equity

in the marital

intended

domicile would

that

Defendant's

be determined

upon

occurrence of one of three events: (a) then the youngest child

8

the

reaches 18; (b) when the home is sold; or, (c) when the Plaintiff
remarries.
On August

30, 1984, Plaintiff

remarried.

At this time,

Defendant's equity in the marital domicile was determined.
trial

court

acknowledged

interpretation

of

this

the Divorce

as

Decree

the
and

plain
its

The

language

interpretation

should be upheld.
B.

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED
Plaintiff argues that the Court, in order to construe the

ambiguities in paragraph 7 of the Decree, is required to look at
the evidence in the record to ascertain the intent of the parties
when drafting paragraph 7.
The

Utah

underlying
language

Supreme

intent

of

the

of

Court

has

held,

the contract

instrument

"Where

possible,

is to be gleaned

itself.

The mere

fact

the

from

the

that

the

parties urge diverse definitions of contract terminology does not
per se, render it ambiguous".

Land vs. Land, 605 P.2d 248 (Utah

1980).
The Decree of Divorce entered on August 14, 1980, by the
Honorable

James

Sawaya,

was

entered

pursuant

to

negotiated

stipulation of both the parties. (Record pp. 21-24 attached as
Exhibit A hereto).
At
counsel,

the

time of the decree, Plaintiff

Robert

B. Sykes, and

in

fact counsel

drafted the Decree of Divorce (see Exhibit A ) .

9

was represented
for

by

Plaintiff

Plaintiff
counsel,

is

now argues that the instrument, drafted

ambiguous

and

that

the

lower

court

by her

resorted

to

extrinsic evidence for its interpretation and the Court's finding
and ruling is in error.

The argument that the Decree of Divorce

is ambiguous must be viewed in light of the fact that it was
counsel for Plaintiff who drafted the order.
The intent of the parties can be ascertained from the plain
language of the instrument and there is no need to resort to
extrinsic evidence•
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT
WAS LIABLE FOR THE COSTS OF IMPROVEMENTS MADE AFTER
PLAINTIFF'S REMARRAIGE AND COSTS OF SALE OF THE HOME
With

respect

to Plaintiff's

interpretation of the term
error,

Defendant

claim

that

the trial

"improvements by Plaintiff",

incorporates

by

reference

courts
is in

his arguments

forth in Section I of the Brief of Cross Appellant.

set

A copy of

said section is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly determined

that Mr. Bettinger's

equity in the marital domicile was to be determined at the time
of Plaintiff's remarriage, and the lower court's ruling in this
regard should be upheld.
The trial court's ruling on the issue of improvements should
be reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor
of Defendant and against Plaintiff as follows:
10

Judgment in the sum of $7,039.00 representing the difference
between the $30,309,00 awarded by the Court and $37,348,00 which
represented the amount of Defendantf s lien together with interest
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from August 30, 1984
to date of judgment.
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Rbbert M. McDonald
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
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a

true

and

accurate

copy

• u
of

the

day of May, 1989, I
foregoing

Brief

of

Respondent upon the following named persons by depositing said
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Craig M. Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON>
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
426 South 500 East
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

4J-/JT9

A/fi .

*****

*-//-/> - *'•&& #M.

CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
i

Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
Civil No. D-80-931

CASS BETTINGER,
Defendant,

On the 1st day of August, 1980, this matter came before
the above-entitled Court, the Honorable James Sawaya, District
Judge, presiding.

Both parties were present and the Plaintiff

was represented by Attorney Robert B. Sykes, and Defendant was
represented by Attorney Delwin T. Pond.

Counsel for Plaintiff

presented an oral stipulation regarding the complete settlement
of this matter, which stipulation was acknowledged to be correct
by Defendant and ordered by the Court to be incorporated in the
Findings of Fact and Decree.

Based upon the foregoing, and good

cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from

Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to become
final six months from the date of entry.
2.

Plaintiff is granted care, custody and control of

the four (4) minor children of this marriage, to wit:
MICHELLE, born June 19, 1967
CHRISTOPHER CASS, born January 15, 19 71
JONATHON SCOTT, born March 11, 1972
NICOLE, born January 4, 1977
Defendant shall have reasonable visitation with each of the
children upon reasonable notice.

EXHIBIT A

3.

Defendant is ordered to pay for child support the

j
i

amount of $200.00 per month per child for a total of $800.00 per ;
month at the time of this Decree.

One-half of the total sum for I

child support is payable on or before the first (1st) day of

I

every month beginning August 1, 1980, and the balance is payable
on or before the sixteenth (16th) day of every month thereafter.
Payment is to be made by way of check.
4.

I

child support payments each year on August 1 by an amount of 8

j
I
j

percent.

j
5.

Defendant is ordered to increase the amount of

I

Plaintiff is granted alimony in the amount of $1.00 j
i

per year.

j
6.

Defendant is ordered to keep in force all medical * ;

insurance on the children which he has through his employment.

j

Defendant is further ordered to pay any major or unusual medical i
or dental expenses such as orthodonic braces.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the

marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510 South,

j
j
I
j
i

Salt Lake City, Utah f subject to a lien thereon for one-half of

j
!
!

the equity that may be in the house at the time of liquidation
(which contemplates an increasing equity as the value increases).
The equity is defined as the fair market value or sales price at
the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of improvements i
made by Plaintiff and costs of sale.

This lien shall not be

forecloseable until the youngest child reaches 18, or until the
home is sold or until Plaintiff remarries.

On the occurrence of j
i

i

any of these events, two-thirds of the house payments then made

j
!
shall be converted to child support and that sum shall be paid to j

the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional child support.
8.

Defendant is ordered to continue making the

payments on the home.

j
i

Defendant shall also be entitled to take

the entire interest portion of the house payment as a deduction
for himself as well as three (3) income tax exemptions on the

i

children with Plaintiff to receive one exemption on the youngest
child at the present time,
9.

With respect to personal property, Defendant is

awarded his books, the stereo (with two speakers to be left
behind), a cock bench, two swivel chairs, a moro chest, enough
bedding, kitchen utensils, etc. to start his own household, the
Toyota Celica, subject to the balance owed thereon, a lamp from
India, the bookcase wall unit, as well as his own personal
effects, clothing, knick-knacks, and such other personal property
as the parties may divide among themselves.
the balance of the personal property.

Plaintiff is awarded

Each party will assume and
I
I

pay any obligations on any of the property awarded by the
Decree.
10.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

i

i
household debts through the date of the Decree as well as those

!
i

specified in the Complaint.
11.

The Stipulation entered into by the parties in open j

court on August 1, 1980, is incorporated into this Decree by

j

reference.

•
i

12.

Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance

!

payable to Plaintiff and/or the children in a sufficient amount
to protect the expectancy interest of the children to child
support during their minority.
13.

i

Plaintiff is awarded $200.00 judgment for
j

attorney's fees against Defendant, which Defendant should pay
within thirty (30) days.
DATED this
/</
day of August 1980.

|
j
j
i
I

BY THE COURT:

;
;

yf

/

!
/^TOflORABLE JAMES SAW AY A
^ D i s t r i c t Court J u d g e

ATTEST
W. STERLING EVANS
BY,

> i w ^

(

^

6 eputy

Ciyrfc

-vAtv.i?:*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Hand Delivery

I hereby certify that I served a copy of the
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE upon Mr.

Delwin Pond, Attorney

for Defendant by causing a true and correct copy thereof to

be hand delivered to said

person

at his

office

at

the

following address:

Mr. Delwin T. Pond
Attorney at Law
1174 East 2700 South
Salt Lake Cityf UT

on this 13th day of August, 1980.
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EXHIBIT-ii
A.

COSTS OF IMPROVEMENTS
The lanquaae :v:thoriziny deduction of costs of improvements

clearly refers ' o i .up: \ vements made prior to the date Defendant's
lien becan>

*: **

-.:

. • ..
becomes
apparent
after

:*-:^ced by t:l le words

entitled
that

to liquidate

ii

thp lipn

improvements

payable inasmuch as the i a n g u a g e author i zi nq

cue language

was payable,

*

«:nt the time

his liei i"" '
made

reference

Defendant

Moreover,
to i n

would

*• - -» -

it is
. •. -

be j a y m g

^ m - t i f t 's home with no possibility

uy any increase

Defendant

:.

to benefit

c: easoi 1 ::: f t:l: le i mpr ovemei ifcs.

The roof repair and r e p l a c e m e n t of $ 7 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 w a s u n d e r t a k e n
:n

w;,

the summer of 1 9 8 6 , a f t e r

,i aDoui October

Decision

. * ~>4

rh<-- • irne

.^ r - ^:

-laintiff

remarried

PI a; .titf's r e m a r r i a g e

para. 5 ) . ' Both expenditures occurred while

r

r.

(Memo

Plaintiff

W'is ' htj sole ^'WiiF't • ' t Mif 11" in*-1 an 1 while Defendant's interest was
limited to his lien
one-half

of

Plaintiff's claim that Defendant must bear

tl le c o s t s

wi

uir

y

i i icoi isis tei it wi 1:1 i

*.*

lienholders, fat11: I i

nconsistent with Plaintiff's actions at the

time

t h e improvements
vem»i:

-:

concept o*

• improvements
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the debtor.

Plaintiff's claims are made with the benefit of hindsight-knowledge that real estate values decreased after August, 1984.
It is readily apparent that if the market forces together with
the improvements had enhanced the market value of the home so
that the selling price in 1987 exceeded the 1984 market value,
Plaintiff would be claiming sole entitlement to the benefit of
the increase.4

This Court should not permit Plaintiff to compel

Defendant to bear a portion of the loss from the decline in the
market when he could not have shared in the gain had the market
increased.
B.

COSTS OF SALE
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Utah Code Annotated §78-37-4 clearly provides that sale proceeds from the collateral which
are in excess of the indebtedness go to the debtor if there are no junior liens.
Paragraph 7 of the decree clearly provides that Defendant benefits from increases in equity
only until Plaintiff remarries (or the occurrence of one of the other triggering events).
Defendant s share of the equity was frozen on that date. Thus, had the value of the home
increased after Plaintiff's remarriage, she would be entitled to the full amount of the increase.
Inasmuch as Defendant is precluded from sharing in any increase in value after Plaintiff's
remarriage, he should likewise be insulated from any decrease in value during the same period.
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